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ABSTRACT
We test overreaction theories of short-run momentum and long-run reversal in the
cross section of stock returns. Momentum profits depend on the state of the market,
as predicted. From 1929 to 1995, the mean monthly momentum profit following pos-
itive market returns is 0.93%, whereas the mean profit following negative market
returns is −0.37%. The up-market momentum reverses in the long-run. Our results
are robust to the conditioning information in macroeconomic factors. Moreover, we
find that macroeconomic factors are unable to explain momentum profits after simple
methodological adjustments to take account of microstructure concerns.
SEVERAL BEHAVIORAL THEORIES have been developed to jointly explain the short-
run cross-sectional momentum in stock returns documented by Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) and the long-run cross-sectional reversal in stock returns doc-
umented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985).1 Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrah-
manyam (1998; hereafter DHS) and Hong and Stein (1999; hereafter HS) each
employ different behavioral or cognitive biases to explain these anomalies.2,3
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1 We use the phrase “short-run” to refer to six- to twelve-month momentum for ease of exposition.
Note that the behavioral models do not address the shorter-run evidence of reversal at the weekly
horizon (Lehmann (1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Cooper (1999)).
2 Ourunderstanding is that thepredictionsof the Barberis, Shleifer,andVishny (1998) model for
momentumprofitsconditionedonthestateofthemarketaredifficulttoassess,whichisthecentral
test of our study as we soon discuss. In their model, individuals typically overreact (underreact)
to low-weight, high-strength news (high-weight, low-strength news). Testing this model requires
identifying and characterizing news in terms of their “strength” and “weight”.
3 The three-factor model of Fama and French (1996) can explain long-run reversal but not short-
run momentum. Ahn, Conrad, and Dittmar (2002) and Yao (2002) employ nonparametric methods
and show that systematic factors explain momentum. To the extent that mispricings are system-
atic, however, the basis assets themselves may also be capturing irrationalities (Hirshleifer (2001)).
Additionally, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that trading volume plays a role in the profits to
momentum strategies, which they interpret to mean that prices generally deviate from fundamen-
tal values. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2003) conclude that tax environments affect the profits to
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Following these models, we test the theory that overreaction is the source of
these return patterns.
DHS assume that investors are overconfident about their private informa-
tion and overreact to it. If investors also have a self-attribution bias, then when
subsequent (public) information arrives, investors will react asymmetrically
to confirming versus disconfirming pieces of news. In other words, investors
attribute successes to their own skill more than they should and attribute fail-
ures to external noise more than they should. The consequence of this behav-
ior is that investors’ overconfidence increases following the arrival of confirm-
ing news. The increase in overconfidence furthers the initial overreaction and
generates return momentum. The overreaction in prices will eventually be cor-
rected in the long-run as investors observe future news and realize their errors.
Hence, increased overconfidence results in short-run momentum and long-run
reversal.
The theory of DHS can be extended to predict differences in momentum prof-
its across states of the market. Aggregate overconfidence should be greater fol-
lowing market gains (DHS and Gervais and Odean (2001)). Since investors in
aggregate hold long positions in the equity market, increases in market prices
will tend to be attributed unduly to investor skill and will result in greater
aggregate overconfidence. If overconfidence is in fact higher following market
increases, then the overreactions will be stronger following these up markets
generating greater momentum in the short-run.
HS also develop a behavioral theory to explain momentum. Their model is
based on initial underreaction to information and subsequent overreaction,
which eventually leads to stock price reversal in the long-run. The HS model
employs two types of investors: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders.” The
newswatchersrelyexclusivelyontheirprivateinformation;momentumtraders
rely exclusively on the information in past price changes. The additional as-
sumption that private information diffuses only gradually through the mar-
ketplace leads to an initial underreaction to news.4 The underreaction and
subsequent positive serial correlation in returns attracts the attention of the
momentum traders whose trading activity results in an eventual overreaction
to news. Prices revert to their fundamental levels in the long-run.
This model also predicts relative changes in price dynamics depending on the
state of the market. HS examine the effect of changing the risk aversion of mo-
mentum traders. In their Figure 2, they found that decreasing risk aversion led
to greater delayed overreaction, and therefore, to increased momentum profits.
To the extent that risk aversion decreases as wealth increases (as suggested
by Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), and
both momentum and contrarian strategies. Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2002) and Korajczyk and
Sadka (2002) question if momentum profits are realizable given trading costs. Finally, the concern
for a data-snooping bias seems small given the foreign-market evidence of Rouwenhorst (1998) and
the 1990s United States evidence of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001).
4 Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002) also develop a model that generates momentum through
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others), this model also predicts that momentum profits will be greater follow-
ing market gains.
We examine whether conditioning on the state of the market is important
to the profitability of momentum strategies. We define two states: (1) “UP” is
when the lagged three-year market return is non-negative, and (2) “DOWN” is
when the three-year lagged market return is negative. We find that short-run
momentum profits exclusively follow UP periods. From 1929 through 1995, the
six-month momentum strategy generates a significant mean monthly profit of
0.93% after three-year UP markets and an insignificant −0.37% profit after
three-year DOWN markets. Furthermore, these profits are significantly differ-
ent, and these results are robust using one-year and two-year lagged market
states and risk adjustments. Hence, consistent with DHS and HS, the state of
the market is critically important to the profitability of momentum strategies.
A central prediction of the overreaction theory is that the momentum profits
will reverse in the long-run as the market eventually corrects the mispric-
ings. Similar to the unconditional results in Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), we find that UP-market momentum profits do
significantly reverse in the long-run. The mean return spread between prior
winners and losers over holding-period months 13 to 60 is reliably negative at
–0.36% per month following UP market states. So when there is momentum,
there is ultimately long-run reversal.
Interestingly, we also find significant long-run reversal following DOWN
states as well, despite the absence of DOWN-state momentum in the short-
run. This finding is not necessarily inconsistent with the overreaction theories
of momentum, since there may be other factors causing long-run reversal in
general. For example, it may be that cyclical variations in risk drive a portion
of the long-run reversal. While we are sympathetic with the intuition behind
time variation in risk, it is important to note that there is concern over how to
model such variation. Ghysels (1998) forcefully shows that popular methods of
modeling variation in risk do not lead to improvements over static risk models.5
One implication of our findings is that long-run reversals are not solely due to
the corrections of prior momentum. Although overreaction does not seem to
entirely explain the lagged-return anomalies, it does seem to explain a large
portion of the momentum and reversal patterns.
The finding that momentum is dependent on the state of the market seems
related to the recent evidence of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002; hereafter
CS) that commonly used macroeconomic instruments for measuring market
conditions can explain a large portion of momentum profits. CS argue that
intertemporal variations in the macroeconomic factors (and presumably risk)
5 Additionally,thereareotherpsychologicalbiasesthatmightexplainlong-runreversalfollowing
DOWN states. Specifically, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) note that investors might have a
salience bias. Given the increased coverage the media gives to the stock market during recessions,
investors may tend to overreact to news in these bad times, only because of the greater saliency of
the news.1348 The Journal of Finance
are the main sources of momentum profits. We examine if such a multifactor
model can explain the asymmetry in momentum profits across UP and DOWN
markets. Dividend yield, default spread, term spread, and short-term inter-
est rates do not capture the asymmetry in momentum profits. Additional tests
indicate that the success of the macroeconomic multifactor model in explain-
ing momentum documented by CS is not robust to common screens used to
mitigate microstructure-induced biases. Specifically, the employment of a one-
dollar price screen (to remove highly illiquid and high-trading-cost stocks) or
the skipping of the month between the formation period and the trading period
(to minimize spurious negative autocorrelation due to bid–ask bounce) reverses
the findings of CS that the macroeconomic model can explain momentum.6
In addition, we consider if the market state is informative about momen-
tum profits beyond the two-state, UP and DOWN, conditioning set we initially
consider. In other words, we examine if momentum profits are greatest when
the market’s state is highest. There is a nonlinear relation between momen-
tum profits and lagged market states. As the lagged market return increases,
momentum increases and reaches a peak near the median level of market per-
formance, slowly declining thereafter. When the lagged market return is high-
est, however, there remain significant momentum profits. We discuss potential
explanations of this nonlinearity. Lastly, using a recursive out-of-sample proce-
dure, we find that the lagged return on the market is a robust predictor of the
time-series of momentum profits, while the macroeconomic multifactor model
is not.
Insum,thestateofthemarketmeasuredusingthelaggedmarketreturncon-
tains information about the profitability of momentum strategies. The remain-
ingsectionsareorganizedasfollows.SectionIdetailsthedataandmethodology
and presents the momentum profits in the short-run and long-run across UP
and DOWN market states; Section II provides several robustness checks and
additional discussions of the main findings, including controlling for a macroe-
conomicfactormodelsimilartoChordiaandShivakumar(2002);andSectionIII
concludes the paper.
I. Analysis of Profits across States
A. Data and Method
The data for the study are all NYSE and AMEX stocks listed on the CRSP
monthly file. Our sample period covers January 1926 to December 1995. Stocks
are sorted at the end of each month t into deciles based on their prior six-
month returns. To mitigate bid–ask bounce effects, the formation-period six-
month returns are calculated from t − 5t ot − 1, skipping month t. We exclude
stocks with a price at the end of the formation period below $1 to mitigate
6 JegadeeshandTitman(1993,2001)andFamaandFrench(1996),amongothers,haveemployed
such filters to better estimate momentum profits. Recently, Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) question
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microstructure effects associated with low-price stocks. The test-period profits
are calculated for three holding periods, t + 1t ot + 6, t + 1t ot + 12, and t + 13
to t + 60, as follows. We define each momentum portfolio as long in the prior six-
month winners (highest decile) and short in the prior six-month losers (lowest
decile). We form a time-series of raw profits corresponding to each event month
of the holding period, that is, we form 60 time-series of profits corresponding
respectively to month 1, month 2,...,month 60. To form the CAPM and Fama–
French (1993) risk-adjusted profits, for each holding-period month, we regress
the time-series of raw profits on the appropriate factors and a constant. Thus,
we obtain the estimated factor loadings for each holding-period-month series.
The risk-adjusted profits are
r
adj
kt = rkt −
 
i
ˆ βik fit, (1)
where rkt is the raw profit for the strategy in holding-period month k, for k =
1, 2,...,60, in calendar month t, fit is the realization of factor i in calendar
month t, and ˆ βik is the estimated loading of the time-series of raw profits in
holding-period-month k on fit. We use the excess return of the value-weighted
market index over the one-month T-bill return as the sole factor for the CAPM
risk adjustments and two additional factors, the small-minus-big return pre-
mium (SMB) and the high-book-to-market-minus-low-book-to-market return
premium (HML), for the Fama–French risk adjustments.7
Themonthlyraw,CAPM-adjusted,orFama–French-adjustedprofitsarethen
cumulated to form the holding-period profits (CAR):
CARt+K2 =
K2  
k=K1
r∗
k,t+k, (2)
where r∗ is either raw (rkt) or risk-adjusted (r
adj
kt ) profits and the (K1, K2) pairs
are (1, 6), (1, 12), and (13, 60). For example, for the month of June 1980, the
CAR over holding-period months 1 to 6 is the sum of the monthly raw or risk-
adjusted profits from January, February, March, April, May, and June of 1980,
where the profit used in each of these months is from holding-period months
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively; and the six-month momentum portfolio in this
case is formed at the end of November 1979 (skipping December). The CAR
performancemetricaboveissimilartoonesemployedbyJegadeeshandTitman
(1993, Tables VII and VIII) and Nagel (2001). Since the CARs are overlapping,
weemployaheteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent(HAC)estimate
of the variance (Gallant (1987)), setting the number of lags equal to the number
of overlapping months in the holding-period window (5, 11, or 47).8
7 We thank Ken French for providing the time-series of data for the Fama–French three-factor
model. These factors are described by Fama and French (1993).
8 We have replicated our tests using six-month nonoverlapping CARs (starting in January/July
and March/September) and find that our results hold.1350 The Journal of Finance
As discussed earlier, the overreaction theories of DHS and HS predict greater
short-run momentum profits following market gains. So at the beginning of
each portfolio’s testing period, we identify the state of the market. Longer
horizons should capture more dramatic changes in the state of the market,
but longer horizons also reduce the number of observations of changes in the
market’s state. For the initial discussion, we employ the return on the CRSP
value-weighted index (including dividends) over the 36 months prior to the be-
ginning of the strategy’s holding period. If the market’s three-year return is
non-negative (negative), we define the state of the market as “UP” (“DOWN”).
We also consider a two-year and a one-year definition of the market’s state and
discuss these results in Section II.B; the findings are robust.9
We estimate the mean profits (CAR) to the six-month momentum strategy
following UP and DOWN states. To test if the mean profits are equal to zero in
each state respectively, we regress the time-series of CARs on an UP dummy
variable and a DOWN dummy variable, with no intercept. To test if the mean
momentum profits following UP and DOWN markets are equal, we regress
the time-series of CARs on an UP dummy variable and an intercept. These
approaches preserve the full time-series of returns and allow us to reliably
estimate the standard errors under serial correlation. Throughout the paper,
we convert profits (and coefficients of reported regressions) to monthly figures
by dividing by six.
Beforediscussingthefindings,theuseoftheFama–French“risk”adjustment
requires discussion. Behaviorists do not interpret the Fama–French model as
a rational risk model. This is because they do not interpret the book-to-market
ratio as a risk measure but as a mispricing measure (see, e.g., Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), Daniel and Titman (1997)). So in the context of
testing behavioral models, the Fama–French alpha is arguably not useful.
In fact, Fama and French (1996) show that their model captures long-run
DeBondt-and-Thaler (1985) reversal, but not short-run momentum. So accord-
ing to the three-factor model, there is only one anomaly in the literature: short-
run momentum. This contradicts the behavioral models that we are examining
which predict short-run momentum and long-run reversal. Nevertheless, we
provide the three-factor alphas for completeness and discuss them throughout.
The short-run results are robust to the Fama–French adjustments, but as ex-
pected, the long-run findings differ slightly when employing the three-factor
model.
B. The Short-run Effects of Conditioning on the State of the Market
The mean CARs for each profit series (raw, CAPM-adjusted, and Fama–
French adjusted) are reported in Table I for the portfolios formed in UP and
DOWN markets, respectively. During 1929:01 to 1995:12, following UP mar-
kets, the raw and the CAPM profits in Panel A are statistically positive for the
9 We have also performed the analyses allowing the factor loadings in equation (1) to be different
across UP and DOWN states, and the results hold.Market States and Momentum 1351
Table I
Momentum Profits and Market States
At the beginning of each month t, all NYSE and AMEX firms are allocated into deciles based on
their lagged six-month returns (from t − 5t ot − 1, skipping month t). Stocks priced under $1
at time t are excluded. Non-negative (negative) returns of the VW CRSP index over months t −
36 to t − 1 define UP (DOWN) markets. Profits of the momentum portfolios (winner minus loser
deciles) are cumulated across three holding periods: months t + 1t ot + 6, months t + 1t ot +
12, and months t + 13 to t + 60. Reported below are the mean monthly profits, CAPM alphas,
and Fama–French alphas over these holding periods during 1929 to 1995. Panels A and B report
the profits following UP and DOWN markets, respectively. Panel C reports the robust t-statistics
(Gallant (1987)) for the test of the equality of profits across UP and DOWN markets. The number
of observations (N) for each state is also given.
Months 1–6 Months 1–12 Months 13–60
Panel A: Average Monthly Profits Following 36-month UP Markets
N 674 668 620
Mean profit 0.93 0.72 −0.36
(t-statistic) (8.41) (9.43) (−3.23)
CAPM alpha 1.12 0.87 −0.28
(t-statistic) (9.84) (10.90) (−2.31)
Fama–French alpha 1.28 1.05 −0.15
(t-statistic) (10.80) (11.87) (−1.77)
Panel B: Average Monthly Profits Following 36-month DOWN Markets
N 124 124 124
Mean profit −0.37 −0.50 −0.67
(t-statistic) (–0.65) (−1.44) (−3.19)
CAPM alpha 0.01 −0.15 −0.51
(t-statistic) (0.03) (−0.49) (−2.61)
Fama–French alpha 0.64 0.42 −0.11
(t-statistic) (1.44) (1.69) (−0.76)
Panel C: Test for Equality (UP – DOWN = 0)
Mean profit (2.26) (3.47) (1.54)
CAPM alpha (2.22) (3.22) (1.19)
Fama–French alpha (1.4) (2.36) (−0.29)
six-month strategy during the first six months of the holding period (termed
the “6/6 strategy”) and are 0.93% and 1.12% per month, respectively. The raw
and CAPM profits for the six-month strategy during the first 12 months of the
holding period (termed the “6/12 strategy”) are 0.72% and 0.87% per month and
are also statistically significant.
The performance of the six-month momentum strategy is, however, dramati-
cally different following DOWN states. In fact, in Panel B, there is no evidence
of six-month momentum profits following DOWN states in either the 6/6 or the
6/12 strategies. The mean raw and CAPM-adjusted profits range from −0.50%
to 0.01% and are not statistically different from zero in any of these cases. Con-
ditioning on the state of the market has a clear and dramatic impact on the
profits to momentum strategies.1352 The Journal of Finance
In Panel C, we provide the t-statistics for testing the equality of the profits
across UP and DOWN states for the three holding periods. Momentum profits
are statistically greater following UP markets using both the raw and CAPM-
adjusted profits for the 6/6 and 6/12 strategy. So, momentum profits are greater
in the short-run following UP markets than following DOWN markets, as pre-
dicted by the overreaction theories.
Note also in Table I that there is less evidence that momentum profits are
greater following UP markets than DOWN markets when using the Fama–
French model. The differences are only significant for the 6/12 strategy. But we
find in Section II.B that defining the state of the market with lagged two-year
or one-year market returns provides strong evidence that UP-market momen-
tum is greater than DOWN-market momentum for the 6/6 strategy even when
using the three-factor model. The asymmetry in short-run momentum profits
is robust to Fama–French (FF) alphas.
C. The Long-Run Reversal in the Proﬁts to Momentum Strategies
If the short-run momentum profits are an overreaction to news, then we ex-
pect to see long-run reversal of the profits to the six-month strategy as the
market eventually corrects the mispricings. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) examine the unconditional mean profits to the
six-month momentum strategy over a five-year holding period and find that
the profits reverse in years two to five—consistent with overreaction and cor-
rection. Figures 1 and 2 plot the cumulative raw and CAPM profits, respec-
tively, to the six-month momentum strategy following UP and DOWN states
in holding-period months 1 to 60. The UP-market plots of the raw and CAPM
profits are consistent with the unconditional findings of Lee and Swaminathan
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Figure 1. Cumulative raw profits in UP and DOWN states. The cumulative mean monthly
profits over the months t + 1t ot + 60 are plotted for the six-month momentum strategy from
1929:01 to 1995:12 following three-year UP markets and three-year DOWN markets, respectively.Market States and Momentum 1353
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
1 1 12 13 14 15 1
Holding Period Returns
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
P
r
o
f
i
t
s
CAPM - UP CAPM - DOWN
Figure 2. Cumulative CAPM profits in UP and DOWN states. The cumulative CAPM alphas
over the months t + 1t ot + 60 are plotted for the six-month momentum strategy from 1929:01 to
1995:12 following three-year UP markets and three-year DOWN markets, respectively.
and Jegadeesh and Titman in that the early momentum profits are offset by
subsequent long-run reversal.
ThelastcolumnofTableIprovidesaformaltestofthesignificanceofthelong-
run reversal in the profits. Following UP markets, there is significant evidence
of reversal in the six-month strategy’s profits in months 13 to 60; both the raw
and CAPM-adjusted profits are reliably negative. Again, this is consistent with
an initial overreaction and subsequent correction.
As discussed earlier, the FF alphas are expected to display less evidence of
long-run reversal. Figure 3 shows this to be the case. But we still can reject in
Table I the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns in the long-run following
UP markets even using the FF method, with a t-statistic of −1.77.
Figures 1 and 2 also indicate that the overreaction theory does not capture
the entire long-run anomaly however. We see strong long-run reversal in the
raw and in the CAPM-adjusted profits of the six-month strategy, despite there
being no early momentum. The average raw and CAPM-adjusted profits during
months 13 to 60 in DOWN states are significantly negative at –0.67% and
–0.52%, respectively. Long-run reversal can apparently exist without short-
run momentum. While overreaction cannot completely explain the short-run
momentum and long-run reversal phenomena, overreaction does seem capable
of explaining a large portion of the lagged-return anomalies.
II. Robustness and Other Considerations
A. Can a Macroeconomic Factor Model Explain These Patterns?
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002; hereafter CS) show that commonly-used
macroeconomic instruments for measuring market conditions can explain a1354 The Journal of Finance
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Figure 3. Cumulative Fama–French profits in UP and DOWN states. The cumulative
Fama–French three-factor alphas over the months t + 1t ot + 60 are plotted for the six-month mo-
mentum strategy from 1929:01 to 1995:12 following three-year UP markets and three-year DOWN
markets, respectively.
large portion of six-month momentum profits. CS show that, after controlling
for cross-sectional differences in returns predicted using lagged macroeconomic
variables, the portfolios of past winners and past losers do not exhibit short-
term return momentum. They conclude that the profitability of momentum
strategies can be attributed to variations in the macroeconomic factors (and
presumably to risk). We examine if such a macroeconomic model can capture
the asymmetries that we find in the profits to the six-month momentum strat-
egy. In other words, is the lagged market return a proxy for changes in the
macroeconomic variables considered by CS?
The return-generating model that CS employ is
rt = a + b1DIVt−1 + b2DEFt−1 + b3TERMt−1 + b4YLDt−1 + et, (3)
wherert isthereturnofstockiinmontht,aandbk (k=1,...,4)arecoefficients,
et is the error term, DIVt−1 is the lagged dividend yield of the CRSP value-
weighted index, DEFt−1 is the lagged yield spread between Baa-rated bonds
and Aaa-rated bonds, TERMt−1 is the lagged yield spread between ten-year
Treasury bonds and six-month Treasury bills, and YLDt−1 is the lagged yield
on a T-bill with three months to maturity.10
To see the extent to which the macroeconomic multifactor model can explain
the profits of the momentum strategies, we employ two-way dependent sorts
as CS do. We first sort all stocks each month into quintiles based on their
predictedreturnsfromthefactormodel,andthenwesorteachofthesequintiles
10 We thank Jeff Pontiff for providing the macroeconomic data used by Pontiff and Schall (1998).Market States and Momentum 1355
further (into quintiles) based on the lagged six-month returns of the stocks. The
predicted returns from the factor model are calculated as follows.
The loadings for each stock on the four macroeconomic factors are calculated
with a time-series regression of stock returns on the four factors and an inter-
ceptusingmonthst−59tot.Theloadingsareupdatedmonthly.Werequirethat
each stock have a minimum of 12 observations within the 60-month window.
We calculate the monthly predicted returns (fitted values from the model using
laggedfactorrealizationsandcoefficientestimates)forallstocksandcompound
these predictions into a six-month factor-model predicted return from t + 1t o
t + 6. Stocks are then sorted into quintiles based on their six-month predicted
returns, and each of these quintiles is further sorted into quintiles based on
lagged six-month returns (t − 5t ot − 1, skipping month t). The raw monthly
returns to each of the 25 portfolios are cumulated over months t + 1t ot+6t o
form CARs as before and are separated into three-year UP and DOWN markets
at time t. The mean profits to these 25 portfolios are calculated and reported
for each state. Finally, the mean profits to a strategy that buys the winner
lagged-return quintile and sells the loser lagged-return quintile within each of
the predicted-return quintiles is also reported.
Unlike CS, who sort on formation-period predicted returns, we first sort
on predicted returns constructed using realized factor values from the hold-
ing period. We contend that the latter window is more appropriate in deter-
mining whether the macroeconomic model explains the return patterns (and
should yield a test with greater power). This is analogous to employing the re-
alized market return to determine if the CAPM explains a given stock’s return
behavior.
With these two-way sorts, we can examine if the cross-sectional variation
in returns predicted by the macroeconomic factor model captures conditional
variation in the momentum profits. In Table II, we present the mean profits for
the two-way sorts from 1929 to 1995. Panel A shows that the macroeconomic
model has no ability to explain the momentum profits following UP states. The
levelofthemomentumprofitswithineachquintileofthefactor-modelpredicted
returns is at least 0.50% per month, and all mean profits are significantly
different from zero. As expected, following DOWN states, Panel B shows no
evidence of momentum within the predicted-return quintiles. In contrast to
CS, the macroeconomic model shows little, if any, ability to capture momentum
profits.
To understand what drives the difference between our findings and those
of CS, we first replicate their method (on unconditional profits). Using (1) the
1963:07 to 1994:12 data, (2) with formation-period predicted returns, (3) with
no price screen, (4) without skipping the last month of the six-month lagged-
return measure of momentum, and (5) employing the nonoverlapping return
method of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), we are able to reproduce the find-
ings of CS reported in Panel B of their Table VII. As shown in Panel A of our
Table III, we also find that the multifactor model captures the unconditional
momentum profits in the four lowest quintiles of predicted returns. The ability
of the macroeconomic model to capture momentum profits, however, is strongly1356 The Journal of Finance
Table II
Two-Way Dependent Sorts: Six-Month Factor-Model Predicted
Returns and Then Lagged Six-Month Returns in UP and DOWN States
All NYSE and AMEX stocks are first sorted each month t into quintiles based on their six-month
(t + 1t ot + 6) predicted returns from the four-factor model: lagged dividend yield of CRSP value-
weighted index (DIV), lagged yield spread for Baa bonds over Aaa bonds (DEF), lagged yield spread
for 10-year Treasury over three-month Treasury (TERM), and lagged yield on a T-bill with three
months until maturity (YLD). Stocks priced under $1 at time t are excluded. Each predicted-return
quintile is then further sorted into quintiles based on lagged six-month returns (t − 5t ot − 1,
skipping month t). Non-negative (negative) returns of the VW CRSP index during months t − 36
to t − 1 define UP (DOWN) markets. Returns of the 25 portfolios are cumulated across months
t+1t ot+6. In Panel A (B), we report the mean monthly returns following UP (DOWN) markets
from 1929 to 1995. The “High-Low” column provides the mean profits of the strategy that buys
the winner quintile and sells the loser quintile within each predicted-return quintile (across each
row). The robust t-statistics (Gallant (1987)) on the profits to this strategy are given in the last
column. The “ALL” column reports the mean returns in each predicted-return quintile. The number
of observations (N) for each state is also given.
Lagged Six-Month Returns
Macro-Model t-Stat
Predicted Returns Low 2 3 4 High ALL High-Low (High-Low)
Panel A: Average Monthly Returns Following 36-month UP Markets (N = 674)
Low 0.49 0.80 0.89 1.05 1.14 0.87 0.65 5.89
2 0.68 0.92 1.01 1.08 1.19 0.98 0.51 6.26
3 0.78 0.93 1.02 1.09 1.28 1.02 0.50 6.18
4 0.77 0.96 1.03 1.10 1.32 1.04 0.55 6.64
High 0.70 0.97 1.08 1.19 1.31 1.05 0.62 6.51
Panel B: Average Monthly Returns Following 36-month DOWN Markets (N = 124)
Low 3.29 3.15 3.02 2.86 2.77 3.02 −0.51 −1.22
2 3.25 2.69 2.35 2.30 1.17 2.35 −0.91 −2.20
3 2.81 2.36 2.06 2.10 2.32 2.33 −0.48 −1.22
4 2.24 2.10 2.03 1.94 2.30 2.12 0.07 0.17
High 2.29 2.29 1.98 2.29 2.85 2.34 0.57 1.37
affectedbymethodologicaladjustmentscommonlyusedinthemomentumliter-
ature to mitigate microstructure concerns. Specifically, when we exclude from
the portfolios stocks priced under $1 at the beginning of the testing period (to
eliminate highly illiquid and high-trading-costs stocks) and skip the last month
between the formation period and the holding period in constructing the mo-
mentum measure (to reduce spurious reversal due to bid–ask bounce), the re-
sults change. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and Fama and French (1996),
among others, have employed such adjustments to mitigate the microstructure
concernsandtherebybetterestimatemomentumprofits.AsreportedinPanelB
of Table III, the application of these adjustments results in significant momen-
tum profits in four of the five quintiles of predicted returns. The predominant
effect of these adjustments is to lower the returns in the lowest quintile ofMarket States and Momentum 1357
Table III
Two-Way Dependent Sorts: Six-Month Factor-Model Predicted
Returns and Then Lagged Six-Month Returns
All NYSE and AMEX stocks are first sorted each month t into quintiles based on their six-month
(t − 5t ot) predicted returns from the four-factor model: lagged dividend yield of CRSP value-
weighted index, lagged yield spread for Baa bonds over Aaa bonds, lagged yield spread for 10-year
Treasury over three-month Treasury, and lagged yield on a T-bill with three months until maturity.
In Panel A, each predicted-return quintile is then further sorted into quintiles based on lagged
six-month returns (from t − 5t ot, including month t); no low-price stocks are excluded. Panel B
employslaggedreturnsfrommonthst−5tot−1,skippingmontht,asthesecondsortandexcludes
stockspricedbelow$1attimet.Wereportthemeanmonthlyreturnsforthese25portfoliosoverthe
holding-period months t + 1t ot + 6 for the period 1963:07 to 1994:12 (the sample period of Chordia
and Shivakumar (2002)). The “High-Low” column provides the mean returns of the strategy that
buys the winner quintile and sells the loser quintile within each predicted-return quintile (across
each row). This table employs the nonoverlapping-return method used by Chordia and Shivakumar
(2002). The “ALL” column reports the mean monthly returns in each predicted-return quintile.
Lagged Six-Month Returns
Macro-Model t-Stat
Predicted Returns Low 2 3 4 High ALL High-Low (High-Low)
Panel A: Average Monthly Returns
(formation-period predicted returns, no price screen, not skipping month t)
Low 0.90 0.97 1.05 1.08 1.10 1.02 0.20 0.63
2 1.08 1.18 1.09 1.14 1.26 1.15 0.18 0.96
3 1.16 1.25 1.26 1.25 1.30 1.24 0.14 0.80
4 1.35 1.41 1.46 1.43 1.59 1.45 0.25 1.39
High 1.36 1.47 1.54 1.65 1.82 1.57 0.46 2.28
Panel B: Average Monthly Returns
(formation-period predicted returns, $1 price screen, skipping month t)
Low 0.23 0.91 1.01 1.08 1.18 0.88 0.95 4.34
2 0.93 1.14 1.11 1.13 1.30 1.12 0.37 2.34
3 1.07 1.22 1.25 1.25 1.33 1.22 0.26 1.62
4 1.23 1.44 1.46 1.46 1.60 1.44 0.37 2.32
High 1.23 1.48 1.56 1.63 1.81 1.54 0.58 3.18
lagged-six-month returns. This is consistent with the adjustments succeeding
in reducing spurious negative autocorrelation. Note that applying either the
price screen or the skip-month return in isolation is sufficient to reverse the
CS findings. Hence, it seems that, while market conditions are critically impor-
tant in determining momentum profits, the macroeconomic-based proxies for
the market’s state are not useful (only the lagged return of the market is).11
11 We also examined several variations of the macroeconomic model, and the results do not
change. We considered the predicted returns (1) without including the intercept, (2) estimating
factor loadings using a two-year window instead of a five-year one, (3) using portfolio loadings
(from 50 size portfolios) as proxies for individual stock loadings, and (4) using a multiple-step-
ahead forecast from the macro model to predict holding-period returns using only information
available at time t.1358 The Journal of Finance
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Figure 4. Number of three-year DOWN states through time. The number of months within
a given year for which the holding-period return of the VW CRSP index over months t − 36 to
t − 1 is negative during 1929 to 1995.
B. Other Horizons for Measuring the Market’s State
In the previous analyses, we employ the three-year return on the market
as the state proxy. As we noted before, longer horizons should capture greater
differences in market states, but longer horizons also yield fewer observations
of DOWN states (124 out of 798 months using the lagged three-year market
return).WeplotthenumberofDOWNmonthsineachyearfrom1929to1995for
thelagged36-monthVWindexinFigure4,andthenumberofDOWNmonthsin
each year for the lagged 12-month VW index in Figure 5. The number of DOWN
statesincreasesasthenumberofmonthsdefiningthemarket’sstatedecreases.
In particular, the 12-month market definition produces 219 DOWN months
(27% of the sample period). The 12-month DOWN states are more dispersed
across the sample period.
To verify that the conditional nature of momentum profits is evident when
using less extreme definitions of DOWN states, we provide in Table IV the
mean profits to the 6/6 strategy conditioning on either the lagged 12-month or
the lagged 24-month return of the CRSP VW index. In Panel A, the UP-market
raw, CAPM, and Fama–French profits are significant and are all above 0.99%
per month for each alternative state proxy. In Panel B, the DOWN-market
raw and CAPM profits are again all indistinguishable from zero.12 Panel C
shows that the momentum profits for all three profit specifications are sta-
tistically greater following UP markets than following DOWN markets using
both alternative state proxies. In sum, our finding that momentum profits are
12 The Fama–French profits display evidence of DOWN-market momentum using the 12-month
definition of the market’s state.Market States and Momentum 1359
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Figure 5. Number of one-year DOWN states through time. The number of months within a
given year for which the holding-period return of the VW CRSP index over months t − 12 to t − 1
is negative during 1929 to 1995.
critically dependent on the state of the market is robust to using lagged two-
year or lagged one-year market returns as the proxy for the market’s state.
C. The Market’s State as a Continuous Variable
We also examine the relation between the lagged market return and momen-
tum profits using the market’s return as a continuous variable, not just the
discrete UP and DOWN states as before. In particular, we are interested if mo-
mentum profits increase monotonically with the lagged market return. When
the lagged market return is highest, are momentum profits the greatest?
To determine this, we regress momentum profits on lagged market returns
as well as the square of lagged market returns. We report the results using
the lagged 36-month market return as the state proxy (the 12-month and
24-month results are similar). As shown in Panel A of Table V, the raw and
risk-adjusted profits are positively related to lagged market returns, confirm-
ingourfindingthatmomentumishigh(low)whenlaggedmarketreturnishigh
(low). Interestingly, the profits are negatively related to the square of lagged
market returns, indicating that profits do not increase linearly with lagged
market returns.13 In Panel B, we report the momentum profits ranking the
market’s 36-month lagged returns into quintiles. We see that profits increase
13 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) also examine the relation between momentum profits and the
square of the lagged market return. However, since their intent is to examine if lead-lag effects are
a source of momentum profits, they employ the lagged market return over the six-month formation
period of the momentum portfolios. They find a negative coefficient on the squared market return
and conclude that this is inconsistent with lead-lag effects contributing to momentum profits.1360 The Journal of Finance
Table IV
Momentum Profits and Alternative Definitions of Market States
At the beginning of each month t, all NYSE and AMEX firms are allocated into deciles based on
theirlagged-six-monthreturns(fromt−5tot−1,skippingmontht).Stockspricedunder$1attime
t are excluded. Returns on the VW CRSP index are computed over the period t − m to t − 1 (where
m = 12 or 24), and non-negative (negative) returns of the VW CRSP index define UP (DOWN)
markets. Profits of the momentum portfolios (winner minus loser deciles) are cumulated across
months t + 1t ot + 6. Reported below are the mean monthly profits, CAPM alphas, and Fama–
French alphas. The sample period is from 1929 to 1995. Panels A and B report the profits following
UP and DOWN markets, respectively. Panel C reports the robust t-statistics (Gallant (1987)) for
the test of the equality of profits across UP and DOWN markets. The number of observations (N)
for each state is also given.
12-Month Market 24-Month Market
Panel A: Average Monthly Profits Following UP Markets
N 579 667
Mean profit 1.04 0.99
(t-statistic) (9.23) (9.53)
CAPM alpha 1.22 1.18
(t-statistic) (10.42) (10.88)
Fama–French alpha 1.37 1.32
(t-statistic) (11.01) (11.71)
Panel B: Average Monthly Profits Following DOWN Markets
N 219 131
Mean profit −0.08 −0.55
(t-statistic) (–0.22) (−0.99)
CAPM alpha 0.22 −0.21
(t-statistic) (0.72) (−0.45)
Fama–French alpha 0.68 0.43
(t-statistic) (2.42) (1.01)
Panel C: Test for Equality (UP − DOWN = 0)
Mean profit (3.00) (2.27)
CAPM alpha (3.05) (2.93)
Fama–French alpha (2.28) (2.05)
dramatically from the lowest levels of lagged market returns to quintile 2. Prof-
its continue to increase as the market state improves, but peak at the median
levels of lagged market return. It is important to point out that momentum
profits remain significant even at the highest levels of the market’s state.
The nonlinear relation documented in Table V seems to suggest that over-
reactions may actually be diminishing beyond some threshold level of prior
market performance. We offer two potential explanations of this phenomenon.
First, it might be that the extreme levels of the market’s performance are co-
incident with the ending of the overreaction phase and the beginning of the
correctional reversals, triggered by the arrival of fundamental news. The on-
set of the reversals would of course diminish the momentum profits. Second, itMarket States and Momentum 1361
Table V
The Lagged Market Return as a Continuous Measure of the State
of the Market
Atthebeginningofeachmontht,allNYSEandAMEXfirmsareallocatedintodecilesbasedontheir
lagged-six-month returns (month t − 5 to month t − 1, skipping month t). Profits on the momentum
portfolios (winner minus loser deciles) are cumulated across months t + 1t ot + 6. The six-month
cumulative profits (raw, CAPM-adjusted, and Fama–French three-factor-adjusted) are regressed
on an intercept, lagged 36-month market return (LAGMKT), and lagged 36-month market return
squared (LAGMKT2). Panel A provides the monthly regression coefficients and robust t-statistics
(Gallant(1987)).InPanelB,momentumportfoliosareallocatedeachmonthtintoquintilesbasedon
the full sample of lagged 36-month market returns; mean monthly momentum profits are reported
along with their robust t-statistics.
Panel A: 36-month Lagged Market
Intercept LAGMKT LAGMKT2 Adj-R2
Mean profit 0.39 2.77 −2.40 0.10
(t-statistic) (1.30) (2.41) (−2.60)
CAPM alpha 0.69 2.33 −2.12 0.08
(t-statistic) (2.83) (2.38) (−2.65)
Fama–French alpha 1.07 1.34 −1.33 0.03
(t-statistic) (4.70) (1.62) (−2.06)
Panel B: Momentum Profits by Quintiles of Lagged 36-month Market States
Low 2 3 4 High
Mean profit −0.12 0.94 1.30 0.92 0.61
(t-statistic) (−0.27) (3.58) (8.31) (5.78) (3.14)
CAPM alpha 0.17 1.22 1.50 1.19 0.64
(t-statistic) (0.43) (4.80) (8.76) (7.06) (3.05)
Fama–French alpha 0.73 1.25 1.66 1.48 0.77
(t-statistic) (1.97) (4.61) (10.12) (8.38) (3.69)
might be that investors are acquiring less private information in the extreme
good states (to overreact to). Welch (2000) finds evidence consistent with this
in his study of analyst herding. There is more herding when prior returns are
highest indicating that there is less unique information in good times.14
D. The Lagged Market Return versus the Macroeconomic
Variables as Time-Series Predictors
In Section II.A, we found that the macroeconomic factor model does not ro-
bustly capture the cross-sectional differences in returns between prior winner
stocks and prior loser stocks. In this section, we consider whether the lagged
market return is a better time-series predictor of momentum profits than the
14 Note also that overconfidence theory does not necessarily predict a fully monotonic relation
between lagged market returns and the level of overconfidence. As Gervais and Odean (2001)
pointed out, overconfident investors might learn of their bias over time.1362 The Journal of Finance
popular macroeconomic factors used in equation (3). We do this by examining
the recursive out-of-sample forecasts of momentum profits formed from the
two competing sets of information: (1) lagged market returns, and (2) macroe-
conomic variables. The out-of-sample analysis complements the prior evidence
on the robustness of the relation between momentum profits and the state of
the market.
To simplify the out-of-sample procedure and maintain a “real-time” frame-
work, the momentum profit series that we seek to predict is the mean profit in
calendar month τ across the six momentum portfolios that are “open” in cal-
endar month τ (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). The first momentum portfolio
is in holding-period month one during month τ, and the sixth portfolio is in
holding-period month six during month τ. Two out-of-sample forecasts for this
times-series of momentum profits are obtained each month as follows.
The first forecast is estimated using the lagged market return and the square
of the lagged market return. The second forecast is estimated using the four
macroeconomic variables in equation (3), DIVt−1, DEFt−1, TERMt−1, and
YLDt−1. The loadings of the momentum profits on each set of “factors” are
estimated with a time-series regression of momentum profits on each separate
set of factors and an intercept using calendar months τ − 120 to τ − 1 for the
first forecast in January 1939. The loadings are updated monthly. We start with
an initial in-sample period of 10 years, and then allow the in-sample window to
expand each month as we roll through the sample. We form the predicted prof-
its each month using the estimated loadings from the most recent in-sample
regression and the lagged factor realizations.
The “lagged-market” forecasts and the “macro” forecasts are evaluated us-
ing two methods. For the first method, we regress the time-series of momen-
tum profits on the two time-series of out-of-sample forecasts and a constant.
The t-statistics on the slope coefficients test that the forecasts provide infor-
mation about momentum profits. The second method is to compare the mean
absolute errors of each forecast (MAE) to the mean absolute error of the “un-
conditional” forecast, which is the historical mean monthly momentum profit
from the rolling in-sample windows. Finding that the MAE of the forecasts is
smaller than the unconditional MAE is evidence of the extent to which momen-
tum profits are forecastable using either the lagged-market variables or the
macro variables.
As we do in the prior analyses, we examine raw, CAPM-adjusted, and Fama–
French-adjusted profits (see equation (1) for our method of adjustment). The
out-of-sample results are reported in Table VI. They clearly show that the
lagged market return alone possesses the ability to predict time-series vari-
ations in momentum profits. The t-statistics from the regressions of momen-
tum profits on the forecasts are above 2.0 for the lagged-market forecasts in
all three measures of the profit series. The t-statistics for the macro forecasts
are small, and the coefficients are even the wrong sign. In addition, the MAE
of the lagged-market forecasts is statistically smaller than the MAE of the un-
conditional forecast at the 5% level or lower in all three of the profit series
(using the z-statistics suggested by Diebold and Mariano (1995)). In fact, theMarket States and Momentum 1363
Table VI
The Forecasting Abilities of the Lagged Market Return
versus the Macroeconomic Variables
Atthebeginningofeachmontht,allNYSEandAMEXfirmsareallocatedintodecilesbasedontheir
lagged six-month returns (month t − 5 to month t − 1, skipping month t). In a given calendar month
τ, the profits to the six “open” momentum portfolios (winner minus loser deciles) are calculated. A
calendar time-series of momentum profits is formed from the mean profits across the six portfolios
in month τ. The raw, CAPM-adjusted, and Fama–French three-factor adjusted monthly profits are
regressed on an intercept, lagged 36-month market return, and the square of the lagged 36-month
marketreturnusinganin-samplewindowof10yearsendingDecember1938.Theforecastedvalues
for January 1939 from this “lagged market” model are formed. The in-sample window is expanded
one month, and the forecasted momentum profits for February 1939 are formed, and so on. A time-
series of out-of-sample forecasts using the four macroeconomic variables, DIV, TERM, DEF, and
YLD is formed similarly and is termed the “macro variables” model (see Table II for definitions of
these variables). The “unconditional” forecasts are the rolling historical mean of the profit series.
Momentum profits from 1939:01 to 1995:12 are regressed onto their forecasted values from the
lagged-market model and the macro variables model in a multiple regression. The t-statistics of
the slope coefficients for each forecast are given below. The mean absolute forecast error for each
model is also given.
Forecast Type t-Statistic Mean Absolute Error
Mean profit Unconditional −0.32 2.95
Lagged market 2.04 2.87∗∗∗
Macro variables −0.79 3.06∗
CAPM alpha Unconditional −0.78 3.20
Lagged market 2.06 3.13∗∗∗
Macro variables −1.22 3.26
Fama–French alpha Unconditional −1.48 2.94
Lagged market 2.37 2.91∗∗
Macro variables −1.72 2.96
Note: The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate that the mean absolute error is statistically different than
the mean absolute error of the unconditional model at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels,
respectively (using the z-statistic of Diebold and Mariano (1995)).
lagged-marketforecastsoutperformtheunconditionalhistoricalmeanbyabout
60 to 96 basis points per year. The MAE for the macro forecasts though is on av-
eragegreaterthantheunconditionalMAEinallcases,andisstatisticallyworse
than the unconditional MAE for the mean profit series. In sum, the lagged mar-
ket return provides robust information about future momentum profits while
the macro variables display no reliable information.15
III. Conclusion
We find that the profits to momentum strategies depend critically on the
state of the market. A six-month momentum portfolio is profitable only
15 Theout-of-sampleresultsforthemacrovariablesareconsistentwiththefindingsinTableIVof
ChordiaandShivakumar(2002)thattheloadingsofthemomentumportfolioonthemacroeconomic
variables are nonstationary over time, even changing signs in some cases across subperiods. We
confirm this finding of nonstationarily in the macro factor loadings.1364 The Journal of Finance
following periods of market gains (UP market states), consistent with the over-
reaction models of Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999). We find that
momentum profits increase as the lagged market return increases. However,
at high levels of lagged market returns, the profits diminish but are not elimi-
nated. Additionally, we reconfirm the findings of Lee and Swaminathan (2000)
and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) that momentum profits are reversed in the
long-run, as predicted by the overreaction theories. We also find significant
long-run reversal in the DOWN states although there is no initial momentum.
This finding indicates that long-run reversal is not solely due to the corrections
of prior momentum.
A multifactor macroeconomic model of returns, as used by Chordia and
Shivakumar(2002),doesnotexplainmomentumprofits.Wefindthattheability
ofsuchamodeltoexplainmomentumprofitsisnotrobusttocontrolsformarket
frictions (specifically, a price screen and skip-month returns). Additionally, we
find that the macroeconomic model cannot forecast the time-series of momen-
tum profits out-of-sample, while the lagged return of the market can. Hence,
we identify that the lagged return of the market is the type of conditioning
information that is relevant for predicting the profitability of the momentum
strategies.
Overall, our findings of asymmetries conditional on the state of the market
complements the evidence of asymmetries in factor sensitivities, volatility, cor-
relations, and expected returns found by Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw
(1997), Whitelaw (2000), Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), and Ang and
Chen (2002). These studies indicate that models of asset pricing, both rational
and behavioral, need to incorporate (or predict) such regime switches.
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